The new tort is tied to the intimate partnership and is distinct from existing torts in that it seeks to compensate the qualitatively different wrong of coercive control, and the qualitatively different harm of loss of autonomy. It is not simply an aggregate, under a broad umbrella, of wrongful conduct already remedied by various existing torts. Under the new tort of intimate partner violence recognized in the reasons in the instant case, a plaintiff must establish three elements.
First, the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath.
Second, the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct. The plaintiff need only show that the defendant intended to engage in the impugned conduct, not that they subjectively intended to control their intimate partner. For guidance, the following are some types of conduct that are capable of constituting coercive control: physical and sexual violence; emotional and psychological abuse, including verbal abuse; harassment, humiliation, and denigration; financial control, stalking, and surveillance; behaviour that isolates a partner from others, or that denies a partner access to educational, employment, and recreational opportunities; litigation abuse; and threatening conduct, including threatening to harm the children or take them away, and threatening to commit suicide.
Third, the conduct, on an objective measure, constitutes coercive control. The trial judge must determine whether a reasonable person, fully apprised of the relevant context of the relationship, would have perceived the defendant’s acts, considered cumulatively, as amounting to an assertion of control over the plaintiff that has the effect of depriving them of their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship. Where circumstances show that the reasonable person would conclude that the abusive conduct is incompatible with the intimate partnership, the burden will be readily met. The harm associated with coercion flows from proof of the wrongful conduct. Accordingly, this new tort does not require the plaintiff to prove any consequential harm separately.
Whether manifested through a single violent act, discrete acts of violence, or a pattern of abuse, the new tort fixes on coercive or controlling conduct by which one partner overpowers the will of the other. The new tort of intimate partner violence fills a gap in the common law by properly recognizing that conduct objectively resulting in domination and control of an intimate partner is a qualitatively distinct wrong from those wrongs redressable through existing torts. It is the intimate partnership context that enables the abuser to exert control over their victim.
Liability arises because coercive control constitutes an interference with an intimate partner’s autonomy; it is inherently incompatible with an intimate partnership as it renders the partnership unequal and results in dignitary harm, alongside, but distinct from, the physical or psychological harm that can be caused by abuse. The focus on coercive control further underscores that this form of abuse is tortious not merely because it arises in intimacy, but because it is a distinct wrong giving rise to a distinct harm. The new tort is designed to recognize the gap in the law and to equip judges with resources in the private law toolbox to respond to the distinctive wrong of intimate partner violence and the distinctive injury to victim’s autonomy that goes beyond the physical and psychological losses it brings in the intimate partner setting. Where the plaintiffs plead material facts that disclose coercive control, judges, with the benefit of this new tort, will be in a position to grant remedies that address the full scope of the harm suffered, rather than confining such claims to a patchwork of existing torts, that, even with aggravated damages, provide only incomplete redress.
Courts must take care not to mischaracterize a victim’s resistance to a partner’s attempt at domination, or all misconduct in a high conflict breakdown, as coercive control under the new tort. An overinclusive new tort that captures acts of resistance risks exposing victims of intimate partner violence to retaliatory claims by perpetrators and may inhibit victims of coercive control from coming forward, thereby raising barriers of access to justice. Mere dysfunction of an intimate partnership, or a relationship marked by an imbalance between the parties in the absence of coercive control, is not intimate partner violence in the same sense.
Source: Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16
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