Post Verdict Delay

A presumptive ceiling for post-verdict sentencing delay should not be imposed. Rather, the appropriate test for assessing whether a post-verdict sentencing delay infringes the right to be tried within a reasonable time as guaranteed by s. 11(b) of the Charter is whether the time taken to impose the sentence was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been in all the circumstances. Where a breach of s. 11(b) is established, the remedy that will ordinarily be appropriate for unreasonable post-verdict sentencing delay is a reduction in sentence.

Section 11(b) of the Charter, which guarantees that any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time, is a constitutional commitment that attaches to each of the many stages in a criminal proceeding and spans from the initial laying of the charge to the final imposition of any sentence. However, the presumptive ceilings established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, that require trials to be conducted within 18 months in provincial courts and 30 months in superior courts do not govern the entire period to which s. 11(b) applies.

The period of post-verdict delay must be assessed separately because, after conviction, the offender is no longer presumed innocent and the fair-trial interests protected before verdict are spent, although significant liberty and security interests remain. The Jordan ceilings were adopted to respond to a specific, proven culture of complacency in bringing accused persons to trial; no comparable evidentiary foundation has been established for the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.

The markedly longer test is well suited to the sentencing context, which is individualized, information-dependent, and often iterative, while remaining sufficiently robust to identify delay that exceeds what was reasonably necessary in all of the circumstances. It reflects the different balance of interests after a valid finding of guilt: the offender’s liberty, security and fair-trial interests remain constitutionally protected, but they are attenuated in light of the adjudicated finding of guilt; at the same time, society’s interest in the timely imposition of a fit and proportionate sentence is heightened. Assessing whether post‑verdict sentencing delay was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been invites a contextual inquiry. The question is not whether the delay was long in the abstract, and there is no fixed duration that automatically triggers s. 11(b). The same period of delay may carry very different constitutional significance depending on the complexity of the sentencing exercise, the information required to impose sentence, and the issues that must be resolved. Whether sentencing has taken markedly longer than reasonably necessary in the circumstances is based on a variety of considerations, and it remains an objective and normative assessment. Relevant considerations may include the overall duration of the delay; the complexity of the case; anything from the parties, the sentencing judge, or the court that might inform the reason for specific periods of delay; the parties’ positions and conduct; and a consideration of how long comparable cases typically take to reach a decision in light of the relevant local circumstances.

The markedly longer standard is objective and normative in nature. That is, the proper inquiry is whether sentencing proceedings have taken markedly longer than they should reasonably take in a criminal justice system functioning as it ought to in a free and democratic society, not how long it happens to take in a particular jurisdiction given existing resource constraints. Methodologically, the markedly longer standard requires courts to compare the time actually taken to complete the sentencing process with the time it reasonably should have taken in all of the circumstances. This assessment is not mechanical, but contextual, and must consider both the overall length of the proceedings and the reasons for particular periods of delay.

Where a breach of s. 11(b) is established, a court must craft the remedy it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances, having regard to the nature of the breach, its effects, and the need to preserve both the offender’s constitutional rights and the public interest in a lawful and proportionate sentence. The balance of rights and interests is qualitatively different in the post-verdict context as the presumption of innocence has been rebutted by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 24(1) of the Charter provides a wide remedial scope and gives rise to a discretionary and contextual inquiry.

The remedy that will ordinarily be appropriate for unreasonable post-verdict sentencing delay is a reduction in sentence, although in exceptional cases a stay of proceedings may be available.

Citation: R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30

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