Courts have used a number of analytical approaches to determine when an intervening act absolves the accused of legal responsibility for manslaughter. For example, both the “reasonable foreseeability” and the “intentional, independent act” approach may be useful in assessing legal causation depending on the specific factual matrix. These approaches grapple with the issue of the moral connection between the accused’s acts and the death; they acknowledge that an intervening act that is reasonably foreseeable to the accused may well not break the chain of causation, and that an independent and intentional act by a third party may in some cases make it unfair to hold the accused responsible. These approaches may be useful tools depending upon the factual context.
However, the analysis must focus on first principles and recognize that these tools are analytical aids and do not alter the standard of legal causation or substitute new tests. Even in cases where it is alleged that an intervening act has interrupted the chain of legal causation, the causation test remains whether the dangerous and unlawful acts of the accused are a significant contributing cause of the victim’s death.
The reasonable foreseeability approach questions whether it is fair to attribute the resulting death to the initial actor and posits that an accused who undertakes a dangerous act, and in so doing contributes to a death, should bear the risk that other foreseeable acts may intervene and contribute to that death.
The time to assess reasonable foreseeability is at the time of the initial unlawful act, rather than at the time of the intervening act as it is too restrictive to require that the precise details of the event be objectively foreseeable. It is the general nature of the intervening acts and the accompanying risk of harm that needs to be reasonably foreseeable. The intervening acts and the ensuing non‑trivial harm must be reasonably foreseeable in the sense that the acts and the harm that actually transpired flowed reasonably from the conduct of the accused. If so, then the accused’s actions may remain a significant contributing cause of death.
Whether an intervening act is independent is sometimes framed as a question of whether the intervening act is a response to the acts of the accused. In other words, did the act of the accused merely set the scene, allowing other circumstances to (coincidentally) intervene, or did the act of the accused trigger or provoke the action of the intervening party? If the intervening act is a direct response or is directly linked to the accused’s actions, and does not by its nature overwhelm the original actions, then the accused cannot be said to be morally innocent of the death.
Source: R. v. Maybin, 2012 SCC 24
Frequently Asked Questions
Reasonable foreseeability asks whether a reasonable person could have anticipated the general type of harm resulting from an action. Courts assess this at the time of the accused’s conduct, not after the fact.
An intervening act is a new event that occurs after the accused’s actions and contributes to the outcome, such as injury or death. It may affect whether the accused is legally responsible.
Not always. If the intervening act was reasonably foreseeable, the accused can still be held responsible. Only truly independent and unforeseeable acts may break the chain of causation.
The chain of causation refers to the link between the accused’s actions and the final outcome. If that chain is broken by an independent event, the accused may not be legally responsible.
Courts focus on whether the accused’s actions were a “significant contributing cause” of the harm or death, even if other factors were involved.
An intervening act may be considered independent if it is:
- Unrelated to the accused’s actions
- Not triggered or influenced by those actions
- Unforeseeable in the circumstances
If it meets these criteria, it may break the chain of causation.
- Foreseeable act: A natural or expected consequence of the accused’s conduct → liability usually remains
- Unforeseeable act: An unusual or unexpected event → may relieve the accused of liability
No. The law only requires that the general nature of the risk and harm be foreseeable, not the precise sequence of events.
Foreseeability is assessed at the time of the original act, not when the intervening act occurs.
Sometimes. If a third party’s actions are:
- Independent
- Intentional
- Not reasonably foreseeable
They may break the chain and shift responsibility away from the accused.
Courts consider whether it is fair to hold the accused responsible for the outcome. If the connection between the act and harm is too remote, liability may not apply.
In manslaughter, even if other events contributed to the death, the accused can still be convicted if their unlawful act was a significant contributing cause and the resulting harm was reasonably foreseeable.
Yes. If the intervening act was independent and unforeseeable, it may be used to argue that the accused is not legally responsible for the outcome.
Causation determines whether the accused can be held legally responsible for the harm. Without it, a conviction for offences like manslaughter may not be possible.
Yes. Causation is highly complex and fact-specific. A criminal defence lawyer can assess whether an intervening act may reduce or eliminate liability.
